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In this paper we explore the inﬂuence of the possibility to short
stocks and/or borrow money in laboratory markets. A key inno-
vation of our study is that subjects can simultaneously trade two
risky assets on two double-auction markets, allowing us to
differentiate between assets with relatively high versus low capi-
talization. Divergence of opinions is created by providing each
trader with noisy information on the intrinsic values of both
assets. We ﬁnd that when borrowing money or shorting stocks is
restricted prices are systematically distorted. Speciﬁcally, stocks
with high (low) capitalization are traded at lower (higher) prices
than their fundamental value. Lifting the restrictions leads to more
efﬁcient prices and more liquidity, thereby also lowering volatility
and bid-ask spreads.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
After the sudden demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 several stock exchanges, including
London and New York restricted the short selling of stocks of ﬁnance companies. This move – argued to
be necessary to stop speculators from driving stocks prices to artiﬁcially low levels – was not
uncommon in the history of ﬁnance. Nobody likes a “spoiler”, and short-sellers are bearish, while most
“common” people bet on rising stock prices. The bears who, during a boom (or bubble) argue that
prices are too high are ridiculed, and if they dare to make money on their opinion by selling short, they
are called economic vandals when a bubble pops. Thus, bans on short selling are neither uncommon
nor unpopular – the public is usually easily convinced that “speculators” need to be tamed.user).
 BY-NC-ND license.
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may keep prices from rising too far. Markets are supposed to aggregate all information available and
incorporate it in prices. When this is possible without constraints, markets should properly reﬂect all
available information, in the vein of Fama’s efﬁcient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970, 1991). The key
question is thus how good markets are at aggregating and disseminating information (Hayek, 1945).
The question whether and how short-selling constraints and limits of arbitrage inﬂuence price
aggregation is central to this issue and is therefore hotly debated. This is particularly relevant since, on
a global scale, constraints on short-selling vary between and within markets. Bris et al. (2007) give
a comprehensive overview on the differences of short-selling restrictions across markets before the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. Subsequently, additional (temporary and/or sector-speciﬁc) bans on short-
selling were imposed in numerous countries (e.g. in the US in 2008 and Germany in 2010). Since it
is still not clear whether isolated bans on short-selling are an appropriatemeasure to “protect”markets
against speculators, further insights in the effects of short-selling constraints on price aggregation are
of high importance from a regulatory point of view.
In a seminal paper Miller (1977) argues that when investors disagree about the value of a stock, the
optimistic buy while the pessimistic sell. When no constraints exist, prices reﬂect the average opinion.
However, in the presence of short-selling constraints, divergence of opinions leads to higher-than-
justiﬁed prices, as pessimists are unable to sell a stock once they no longer hold it, while optimists
can buywithout any limitations other than themoney they have. As a consequence prices will be set by
the optimists and thus too high. This is called the “overvaluation hypothesis” (see Dufﬁe et al., 2002;
Jiang, 2005; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; for more literature supporting
this view). In contrast, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) claim that prices will not be biased because of
short-selling constraints if traders have rational expectations. According to their analytical model,
short-selling constraints only decrease the speed of price adjustment to private information.
The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed.1 We attribute this to the difﬁculties in measuring
relevant variables. Speciﬁcally, to explore the effect of short-selling constraints on market efﬁciency
researchers have to (i) measure the degree to which shorting is constrained, (ii) estimate the intrinsic
value of the stock, and (iii) measure the degree of divergence of opinions. None of the three is easy, but
especially the last two are extremely tricky. Calculating the correct intrinsic value of a stock (if it exists
at all) is the goal of a whole profession and so far no generally accepted model has been found.
Similarly, collecting the different opinions on the market is virtually impossible. Thus, for both ques-
tions empirical research has to rely on proxies, which are noisy at best, biased at worst.
Given the methodological challenges to empirical studies, we think this issue lends itself naturally
to experimental exploration. In laboratory markets we can control the institutional rules, intrinsic
values of the contracts traded, and the fundamental information available to participants, thus solving
all three of the tricky estimation problems that hamper empirical studies in this ﬁeld.
We are aware of four studies that have explored the effects of short-selling restrictions in an
experimental setting: Ackert et al. (2002), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), and King et al. (1993) are all
based on the classical Smith et al. (1988) setting and ﬁnd (weak) support for Miller’s overvaluation
hypothesis. However, in all three studies participants receive symmetric information, while asymmetry
is an important feature of real markets. Fellner and Theissen (2011) set up a model with asymmetric
information with results corroborating the overvaluation hypothesis, but they restrict the number of
tradable assets to only one (as do Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; King et al., 1993). Only Ackert et al. (2002)
implement trading in two assets. However, while one asset is intended to replicate a stock, the other is
likened to a lottery ticket, as it has only a 4-percent-chance of generating a positive payoff. Thus, also in
this study the important issue of investment decisions between different stocks, which is central to real
ﬁnancial markets, is not addressed.
A static equilibrium model proposed by Jacobsen et al. (2000) indicates that short-selling
constraints on stocks will lead to a systematic bias, notably the overvaluation of low-capitalized1 See Asquitha et al. (2005); Boehme et al. (2006); Bris et al. (2007); Chen et al. (2002); Cohen et al. (2007); Daouk and
Charoenrook (2005); Desai et al. (2002); Doukas et al. (2006); Figlewski and Webb (1993); Jones and Lamont (2002); Nagel
(2005); Safﬁ and Sigurdsson (2011) for various approaches delivering inconclusive results on this issue.
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describes is likely to be affected by the capitalization of a speciﬁc stock. In our experiments short-
selling constraints are independent of market capitalization, thus disentangling these two variables.3
Our design allows for the ﬁrst time to differentiate between high- versus low-capitalized stocks and
the interaction effects between relative capitalization of a stock and constraints to shortingmoney and/
or stocks.
Based on the existing literature we implement experiments where two risky assets with differing
capitalization are traded. Having two assets we examinewhether any systematic mispricing in settings
with/without short-selling constraints can be observed. Divergence of opinion is created by supplying
participants with noisy information about the intrinsic values of the assets traded.
We ﬁnd that allowing short-selling of stocks does increase efﬁciency in our markets. In sessions
where short-selling is constrained we observe systematic overvaluation (undervaluation) of stocks
with relatively low (high) capitalization. When only borrowing money is allowed this result remains
unchanged but the overall price level is higher. However, when borrowing money and shorting stocks
is allowed, no such bias can be observed. In addition, liquidity is higher and volatility is lower when
borrowing money and shorting stocks is allowed. General overvaluation is not present when shorting
money is forbidden.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we derive several testable conjectures on the impact
of short-selling restrictions on price distortions. Section 3 presents the experimental setup, while
Section 4 discusses the methodology for testing our conjectures. Section 5 presents the main results,
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Conjectures
Jacobsen et al. (2000) suggest that short-selling constraints will cause overvaluation of low-
capitalized stocks as well as undervaluation of high-capitalized stocks. The main reason is that,
lacking the ability to go short, traders with relatively low expectations for the stock no longer inﬂu-
ence its price once they have sold all their respective holdings. Thus, a few traders with particularly
high expectations set the price and through their readiness to buy they can stabilize the stock price at
a level above themedian expectation. This is especially relevant for low-capitalized stocks, as here the
limited amount of money that traders have allows them to buy a higher share of the total number of
stocks available.4 When borrowing money is possible this problem is not resolved, but the unlimited
access to cash is likely to lead to higher average prices. Only allowing to short stocks will resolve this
systematic bias, as then traders with relatively low expectations for a stock can short it and thus
counterbalance the traders with the highest expectations. Consequently the ﬁrst set of conjectures
reads:
Conjecture 1a: When borrowing money and shorting stocks is forbidden, low-capitalized stocks will be
overpriced relative to their intrinsic value while high-capitalized stocks will be
underpriced.2 The model is inspired by, but not limited to, the observation of such systemic price distortions in prediction markets
pioneered by Berg et al. (1996). Suppose there are 100 traders in a market, each with 1,000 in cash. There are 1,000 low-
capitalized stocks X, trading at 5, and 1,000 high-capitalized stocks Y, trading at 95. Suppose ﬁve traders expect an intrinsic
value of 6 for stock A, while all others expect an intrinsic value of 5 or less. The ﬁve traders with the highest expectation for the
intrinsic value of X have enough cash to buy all the X-stocks in the market for a price of 5 and to stabilize prices at this relatively
high level. To buy all of stock Y almost all the money in the market would be necessary and thus no overvaluation should occur.
This is also evident in literature on prediction markets, which frequently feature high-capitalized and low-capitalized stocks.
Here a systemic distortion (overvaluation of low-capitalized stocks and undervaluation of high-capitalized stocks) is frequently
observed (see Berlemann and Schmidt, 2001).
3 Some empirical studies even use market capitalization as a direct proxy for short-selling constraints (see Chen et al., 2002;
Diether et al., 2002), arguing that the costs for allocating shares that can be borrowed will be higher for low-capitalized ﬁrms
(see also Reed, 2002).
4 As a consequence low-capitalized stocks are easier to manipulate, as evident by them being the usual “targets” in stock
spam e-mails (see Hanke and Hauser, 2008).
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overpriced relative to their intrinsic value while high-capitalized stocks will be under-
priced, but overall prices will be higher.
Conjecture 1c: When borrowing money and shorting stocks is possible there will be no systematic price
distortions.
If Conjecture Set 1 is conﬁrmed, then this is likely due to a few traders with the highest expectations
buying most of the low-capitalized stocks. Thus, holdings of such stocks will be more concentrated
than those of stocks with comparably high capitalization, as long as borrowing money and shorting
stocks is not allowed.When borrowingmoney is allowed, the cash limitation on buying the stocks with
high capitalization no longer holds, so for these stocks as well the traders with the highest expectation
can buy most of the stocks outstanding. Thus, the stock concentration should be the same across all
stocks. This line of argumentation holds as well when shorting stocks is also possible. Conjecture Set 2
therefore reads:
Conjecture 2a: If borrowing money and shorting stocks are forbidden, stock holdings will be more
concentrated for stocks with low capitalization than for stocks with high capitalization.
Conjecture 2b: With the possibility to borrowmoney, concentrations of stock holdings will be more similar
across different capitalization levels.
Conjecture 2c: When borrowing money and shorting stocks are possible there will be no differences in
concentrations of stock holdings.
Trading activity is also likely to be inﬂuenced by the market setting: when borrowing money and
shorting stocks are constrained, traders with relatively low expectations for a speciﬁc stock can only
sell their initial endowment of this stock, but not short it. Similarly, traders with the highest expec-
tations for the value of a stock cannot buy unlimitedly, as their cash is restricted. Consequently they
cannot trade as much as they would possibly like to. When shorting stocks and borrowing money are
possible no such constraints exist. This leads to
Conjecture 3: Trading activity will be lowest in sessions with constraints on money and stocks, and highest
when borrowing money and shorting stocks is possible.
When borrowing money is not allowed, the amount of money provided initially allows to buy
a relatively larger share of low-capitalized stocks. E.g., 200 in cash allows to buy 40 stocks priced at
5, but only 4 stocks priced at 50. When the number of outstanding stocks is the same for each
asset, the relative trading volume (number of shares traded divided by shares outstanding) will be
higher for low-capitalized stocks. However, when borrowing money is possible this no longer
holds – and even less so when shorting stocks is also possible. Consequently we formulate
Conjecture Set 4:
Conjecture 4a: In the setting with constraints on borrowingmoney and shorting stocks trading volumewill
be higher for stocks with low capitalization than for stocks with high capitalization.
Conjecture 4b: When the money constraint is lifted, no such pattern will emerge.
In the laboratory as well as in real markets, bid-ask-spreads and volatility are strongly driven by
liquidity and trading volume. If Conjecture 3 holds we should see lower bid-ask-spreads and lower
volatility when shorting stocks is possible thanwhen it is constrained. Our ﬁnal conjectures 5 and 6 are
therefore:
Conjecture 5: The bid-ask-spread is higher when shorting stocks is constrained.
Conjecture 6: Volatility of prices is higher when shorting stocks is constrained than when it is possible.
Table 1
Settings of the experiment distinguished by whether shorting money and or stocks is allowed.
Short money Short stocks Label
Setting 1 No No BMF_SSF
Setting 2 Yes No BMA_SSF
Setting 3 Yes Yes BMA_SSA
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We run laboratory experiments where we control the intrinsic values of the stocks traded as well as
the information signals given to traders.5 Subjects trade one period assets that have an intrinsic value
between 5 and 95. In each period two assets (A and B), whose values add up to 100, are traded on two
separate continuous double-auction markets. This is an important modiﬁcation to earlier studies with
only one risky asset (e.g. Fellner and Theissen, 2011; King et al., 1993), because it allows to distinguish
between stocks with relatively high and relatively low intrinsic values, which is essential to test our
conjectures.
We create three settings distinguished by whether borrowing money and/or shorting stocks is
possible. Speciﬁcally, in setting 1 (labeled BMF_SSF for Borrowing Money Forbidden_Shorting Stocks
Forbidden, throughout the text) going short in money or stocks is not possible. In setting 2 (BMA_SSF,
Borrowing Money Allowed_Shorting Stocks Forbidden) it is possible to take out loans to buy stocks on
margin without limitations and extra costs. Finally, in setting 3 (BMA_SSA, Borrowing Money Allow-
ed_Shorting Stocks Allowed) borrowing money and shorting stocks is possible without limitations at no
extra cost at no extra cost (see Table 1 for a detailed description of all settings).6
Eachmarket is populated by 20 subjects who trade for 20 independent periods (p). In 10 periods the
intrinsic values are calculated as
vA;p ¼
100
x
¼ 100 vB;p; x˛f2;4;6;.;20g; (1)
while in the other 10 periods vA and vB are interchanged. As a benchmark we always set the sum of
the intrinsic values of the two stocks to 100. The sequence of periods is randomized and is shown in
Table 2.
The set in Table 2 allows us to compare cases when the two intrinsic values differ widely (e.g., 95 vs.
5) to others where the difference is smaller (75 vs. 25) or even zero (50 vs. 50). Most cases intentionally
have a large difference in capitalization between the two stocks, as we are interested in the interaction
between relative capitalization (high versus low) and constraints on shorting money and/or stocks.
Each trader starts each period with 4 shares of A, 4 shares of B, and 200 in cash. Traders therefore
hold 400 in stocks and 200 in cash for a starting wealth of 600. The market is a zero-sum game –
whatever one trader wins is at the expense of another trader, and an end-of-period wealth of 600
reﬂects a net return of zero. As the total number of stocks in themarket is equal for A and B, a stockwith
an intrinsic value of 5 or 10 is relatively low-capitalized, while a stock with an intrinsic value of 90 or 95
is high-capitalized and we use the terms “stock with low (high) intrinsic value” and “low-(high-)
capitalized stock” synonymous.
Prices are set exclusively by actions of the traders in two continuous double-auction markets with
open order-books (see screenshot in the Appendix). Similar to most stock exchanges all orders are
executed according to price and then time priority. Market orders have priority over limit orders in the
order-book and are always executed instantaneously. Each transaction is for one stock.5 See instructions in the Appendix.
6 Theoretically a fourth setting, with constraints on borrowing money, but none on shorting stocks, is conceivable. However,
such a situation does not exist (and is unlikely to ever exist) in the real world, while the three settings we cover exist for
different assets and markets.
Table 2
Intrinsic values of stock A and B in the 20 periods of each session.
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
vA 16.67 92.86 25.00 5.56 6.25 90.00 87.50 8.33 50.00 95.00 91.67 7.14 50.00 83.33 5.00 94.44 10.00 75.00 93.75 12.50
vB 83.33 7.14 75.00 94.44 93.75 10.00 12.50 91.67 50.00 5.00 8.33 92.86 50.00 16.67 95.00 5.56 90.00 25.00 6.25 87.50
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intrinsic values of the stocks and create divergence of opinions at the same time, each trader receives
a noisy signal on the value of each stock. To ensure that themedian signal is an unbiased estimate of the
intrinsic value, we predetermine the deviations from a normal distributionwith a standard deviation of
2. Speciﬁcally, we draw ten positive deviations and “mirror” them (take the respective negative
deviation) for the other ten subjects in the market. The same absolute deviations are used for all
periods. The quality of information each individual receives (determined by deviation of fundamental
information and intrinsic value) is different in each period. As the intrinsic values of A and B always add
up to 100, which is public knowledge, the two signals a trader receives also add up to 100, i.e. if his
signal for A is upward biased by x, his signal for B is downward biased by x.7
Holdings of money and stocks are not carried over from one period to the next, but all stocks are
bought back by the bank (the experimenter) at their intrinsic values at the end of each period. At this
time, the intrinsic values of both stocks are revealed to all traders and gains or losses in experimental
currency are balanced with the traders’ total payouts (V0.02 for every unit of experimental currency).
At the start of the next period each trader is again endowed with 4 stocks A and B and with 200 units of
money.
We conducted a total of twelve sessions, four sessions for each treatment. In each session 20
subjects, all students of business or economics students, traded for 20 periods of 120 s each. Several
sessions were conducted at Yale University and the others at the University of Innsbruck (Austria). On
average each session lasted about 60min and average earnings were $ 22 in the U.S. andV18 in Austria.
No person participated in more than one of the experimental sessions reported here. The experiments
were programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited with ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004).4. Method
To shed light on the conjectures formulated in Section 2, we apply OLS regressions on period data
gathered in the experiments. As we conducted twelve sessions m, each covering two stocks st in 20
independent periods p, we have 480 observations for each dependent variable.
We consider several possible explanatory variables. First, we separate the three settings by intro-
ducing dummies.8 Additionally, we examine whether some of our results are inﬂuenced by the
intrinsic value of a stock. For a more convenient interpretation, we introduce a normalized proxy for
the intrinsic value, given by:
Vm;st;p ¼ vm;st;p  5045 ; (2)
hence Vm,st,p takes values between 1 (for a stock with v ¼ 5) and 1 (for a stock with v ¼ 95). To test
whether effects differ for sessions with or without restrictions on shorting stocks or money we interact7 Note that subjects were informed in the instructions that the values of the two assets always add up to 100. If subjects had
received two signals with positive error terms, adding up to e.g. 104, they could have inferred that their signals are upward
biased and may have ignored them.
8 BMF_SSF, BMA_SSF, and BMA_SSA take the value 1 for the settings Borrowing Money Forbidden_Shorting Stocks Forbidden,
Borrowing Money Allowed_Shorting Stocks Forbidden, and Borrowing Money Allowed_Shorting Stocks Allowed, respectively, and
0 otherwise.
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bBMA_SSA,V, respectively.
It is also reasonable to expect traders to change their behavior over the course of the experiment.
We therefore use period p to detect possible learning effects. As p 1,2,.,20, we normalize this variable
by subtracting the mean:
PER ¼ p 10:50PER˛ 9:5;8:5;.;9:5: (3)
PER is used as an independent variable and the basic regression equation then reads:
ym;st;p ¼ bBMF SSF$BMF SSF þ bBMA SSF$BMA SSF þ bBMA SSA$BMA SSA
þ bBMF SSF;V$BMF SSF$V þ bBMA SSF;V$BMA SSF$V þ bBMA SSA;V$BMA SSA$V
þ bPER$PERþ um;st;p; (4)
with um,st,p ¼ rum,st,p1þεm,st,p to account for possible autocorrelation in the residuals.9 The resulting
AR(1) coefﬁcient will be reported with the regression results. To deal with the econometric problems
resulting from heteroscedasticity as well as autocorrelation in our data, we apply the period SUR
method to compute robust covariances (Beck and Katz, 1995).
Depending on our research questions, we introduce the dependent variables used in these
regressions in Section 5. Considering our experimental design, we cannot assume that the
observations for stock A and stock B are independent. Hence, we use separate regressions for each
stock.5. Results
5.1. Over/undervaluation
According to Jacobsen et al. (2000) and to Conjecture 1, the over/undervaluation of a stock in our
experiment should depend on its intrinsic value when borrowing money and/or shorting stocks is
constrained, i.e. we should see overvaluation of low-capitalized stocks and undervaluation of high-
capitalized stocks. To analyze this relationship, we start by calculating the average price of all trans-
actions, Pm,st,p, for each stock in each period.10 Taking into account the intrinsic value v, we calculate the
over/undervaluation for each observation by
Mm;st;p ¼ Pm;st;p  vm;st;p: (5)
For a ﬁrst graphical impression on the over/undervaluation, we divide our sample into three
categories according to the intrinsic value v. The categories are zero to 24.9 (category 1, shown in black
in Fig. 1), 25–75 (category 2, gray in Fig. 1), and 75.1 to 100 (category 3, white in Fig. 1). Fig. 1 shows the
results for the three settings.
The ﬁrst 3 bars in Fig. 1, referring to setting 1, where neither borrowing money nor shorting stocks
was allowed, conﬁrm the postulated relationship between intrinsic value and over/undervaluation: in
category 1, combining stocks with relatively low intrinsic values, we observe the highest average
overvaluation, while the highest average undervaluation can be found in category 3, covering the
stocks with the highest intrinsic values. This is in line with Conjecture 1a. Also note that on average we
observe slight undervaluation in setting 1, in contrast to Miller (1977).9 Signiﬁcant autocorrelation in the residuals can be found in approximately half of the regressions we conduct. Thus,
including one AR term makes good sense although we lose a minimum of 12 observations per regression. The results are,
however, found to be robust against ignoring autocorrelation as well.
10 The results do not change qualitatively if we use closing prices or the average of best bid and best ask at the end of period to
calculate Pm,st,p.
Fig. 1. Over/undervaluation of stocks separated by settings: setting 1, BMF_SSF, without shorting money or stocks (left), setting 2,
BMA_SSF, where shorting money was allowed (center), and setting 3, BMA_SSA, where going short was possible in money and stocks
(right); and categories: black bars for intrinsic values from 5 to 24.9 (category 1), gray for values from 25 to 75 (category 2), and
white for values from 75.1 to 95 (category 2).
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valuation is highest for the stocks with the lowest intrinsic values and negative (i.e. undervaluation) for
the stocks with the highest intrinsic values. But here we see that the average overvaluation across the
three categories is positive, as the unlimited supply of money increases average prices and conse-
quently the average overvaluation. This conﬁrms Conjecture 1b.
For setting 3, with borrowing money and shorting stocks allowed, we ﬁnd a moderate average
overvaluation that is almost constant across all three categories, giving support to Conjecture 1c.
To assess the overall accuracy of prices in our experiments, we analyze the descriptive statistics of
the squared mispricing (deﬁned as SQMm;st;p ¼ M2m;st;p) as shown in Table 3.
Considering the mean squared error of prices, the mispricing observed in setting 3 is not only less
systematic than in the other two settings, it is also less pronounced. Hence, we conclude that allowing
short selling and borrowing money increases informational efﬁciency in our experimental markets.
To test for the relation between intrinsic value and over/undervaluation, we use over/undervalu-
ation Mm,st,p as the dependent variable in the regression described in Eq. (4). The results are given in
Table 4.
The results of the regression do not conﬁrm the overvaluation hypothesis of Miller (1977): When
borrowing money and shorting stocks is forbidden, overall mispricing in our experiment is econom-
ically and statistically not different from zero. However, unlimited access to money in setting 2 leads to
higher prices in this setting and for stock A we ﬁnd signiﬁcant overvaluation (p ¼ 0.006). When in
addition shorting stocks becomes possible in setting 3, the signiﬁcant overvaluation disappears, so the
ability to short stocks seems to reduce prices, giving some support to Miller’s hypothesis.Table 3
Mean and standard deviation for squared mispricing M2m;st;p across the three settings of the experiment.
BMF_SSF BMA_SSF BMA_SSA
Mean 0.719 0.579 0.417
Std. Dev. 0.985 1.176 0.640
Table 4
Over/undervaluation – results for the regression Eq. (4) with Mm,st,p as the dependent variable, p-values for two-sided tests.
Coeff. Stock A Stock B
Est. p val. Est. p val.
BMF_SSF 0.120 0.141 0.049 0.708
BMA_SSF 0.175 0.006 0.007 0.955
BMA_SSA 0.102 0.307 0.044 0.671
bBMF_SSF,V 0.571 0.000 0.506 0.000
bBMA_SSF,V 0.344 0.000 0.370 0.001
bBMA_SSA,V 0.076 0.478 0.048 0.587
bPER 0.014 0.195 0.003 0.864
AR (1) 0.076 0.392 0.216 0.013
R2 0.241 0.199
n 228 228
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bBMA_SSF,V for the two settings where shorting stocks was not possible are negative for both stocks
(all four are signiﬁcant at the 1% level). This indicates that the over/undervaluation depends on
market capitalization – the higher the intrinsic value, the higher the undervaluation and vice versa.
Relative to the average level, the stocks with the lowest capitalization were overpriced by averages
of 0.34–0.57, while stocks with the highest capitalization were underpriced. In contrast, this does
not hold for setting 3, where borrowing money and shorting stocks was possible, and where
bBMA_SSA,V is insigniﬁcant for both stocks, again in line with Conjecture 1c: only the possibility to
short stocks eliminated the systematic overpricing (underpricing) of stock with relatively low (high)
capitalization.
The insigniﬁcant value for bPER shows that the extent of over/undervaluation does not depend on
the period; i.e. no learning effects are visible. We consider this important because it suggests that the
observed pattern is persistent. We also checked for cross-dependencies by interacting PER with the
treatment dummies and V. Again, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects. We observe signiﬁcant positive
autocorrelation (AR1) for stock B, indicating that a high (low) overvaluation in a trading session may
partly persist from one period to another.
We conclude that in our markets constraints on shorting money and stocks proved to be the main
factor causing systematic deviations in prices.
5.2. Stock concentration
Wehave seen that in sessionswith constraints on shorting stocks prices are distorted, as stockswith
low intrinsic values are systematically overpriced. The most likely reason for this is that traders with
the highest expectations for the intrinsic values of these stocks buy most of them, and thereby keep
prices high. Conjecture 2 is a logical consequence of this: holdings of low-capitalized stocks will be
more concentrated among a small number of traders than holdings of high-capitalized stocks, as long
as money constraints exist. When borrowing money is possible no such effect should be observed.
Hence, settings 2 and 3 should deliver similar results.
Fig. 2 presents the respective Lorenz curves for setting 1 (top left), setting 2 (top right) and setting 3
(bottom left).11 For setting 1 we ﬁnd that concentration of holdings clearly depends on the intrinsic
value of a stock: it is largest in categories 1 (where the stocks with the lowest intrinsic values are
comprised), next is category 2, and ﬁnally category 3, as predicted by Conjecture Set 2. The panels for
settings 2 and 3 look quite different from setting 1: when the restrictions on borrowing money are
lifted no systematic relationship between capitalization and stock concentrations can be found, thus
supporting Conjecture Set 2.11 For setting 3 we observe small negative holdings of up to 5% due to short positions and correspondingly positive holdings
of up to 105%. The curves are cut off in the ﬁgure to keep the scaling comparable.
Fig. 2. Lorenz curves for categories. Short dashes: category 1 (low-capitalized stocks with values between 5 and 24.9), dashes:
category 2 (values between 25 and 75), solid line: categories 3 (high-capitalized stocks with values above 75) in setting 1 without
shorting money or stocks (top left), in setting 2 where shorting money was allowed (top right), and in setting 3 where going short
was possible in money and stocks (bottom left).
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Aggregating the number of stocks owned by the ﬁve traders with the highest holdings gives us
a testable proxy CON for stock concentration.12 CON is then used as the dependent variable in Eq. (4).
Considering the coefﬁcients BMF_SSF,BMA_SSF, and BMA_SSA in Table 5, we observe the stock
concentration to be highest for setting 3, where borrowing money and shorting stocks was possible. A
Wald-test shows that in this setting the average number of stocks in the portfolio of the ﬁve largest
holders is signiﬁcantly larger than in settings 1 and 2. This can be attributed to the fact that the
maximum number of stocks held by ﬁve traders is unlimited in the sessions where shorting stocks is
possible, thus the concentration can be expected to be higher in this setting.
The results for the interaction terms, presented in Table 5 give further support to Conjecture 2:
while all coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant, we clearly see that the coefﬁcients for setting 1 (5.9 and 5.8
respectively for stocks A and B) are several times larger than those for the other two settings (betas
from 1.2 to 2.9). We think this result can be attributed to the fact that – as in real markets – not all
traders make use of the possibility to go short in stocks or borrow money.
To sum up, we ﬁnd that especially in setting 1 holdings of low-capitalized stocks are more
concentrated than holdings of high-capitalized stocks. In settings 2 and 3 the difference is much
smaller.12 The results are robust to changes in the number of traders aggregated.
Table 5
Stock concentration – results for the regression Eq. (4) with CONm,st,p as the dependent variable, p-values for two-sided tests.
Coeff. Stock A Stock B
Est. p val. Est. p val.
BMF_SSF 39.112 0.000 38.956 0.000
BMA_SSF 40.112 0.000 40.351 0.000
BMA_SSA 43.558 0.000 41.789 0.000
bBMF_SSF,V 5.943 0.000 5.768 0.000
bBMA_SSF,V 1.213 0.006 1.194 0.012
bBMA_SSA,V 2.883 0.000 1.376 0.068
bPER 0.026 0.675 0.021 0.754
AR (1) 0.109 0.265 0.168 0.106
R2 0.341 0.326
n 228 228
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We observed lively trading in all twelve sessions, with an average volume (VOL) of more than 1,000
trades per session. Partly conﬁrming Conjecture 3, the average volume was highest in setting 3 (1,130
trades per session) where shorting stocks was possible. Surprisingly, trading volume in setting 2 (995
trades per session) was lower than in setting 1 (1,066 trades per session).
Fig. 3 compares the number of transactions dependent on intrinsic value without shorting stocks or
borrowing money (top left), with borrowing money (top right), and with borrowing money andFig. 3. Average trading volume sorted by the intrinsic value of the stock traded in setting 1 without shorting money or stocks (top
left), in setting 2 where shorting money was allowed (top right), and setting 3 where going short was possible in money and stocks
(bottom left).
Table 6
Volume – results for the regression Eq. (4) with VOLm,st,p as the dependent variable, p-values for two-sided tests.
Coeff. Stock A Stock B
Est. p val. Est. p val.
BMF_SSF 27.455 0.000 25.867 0.000
BMA_SSF 25.731 0.000 24.136 0.000
BMA_SSA 30.113 0.000 26.478 0.000
bBMF_SSF,V 6.594 0.000 6.972 0.000
bBMA_SSF,V 0.996 0.145 1.047 0.073
bBMA_SSA,V 2.410 0.005 0.461 0.604
bPER 0.157 0.145 0.187 0.033
AR (1) 0.201 0.023 0.198 0.024
R2 0.25 0.277
n 228 228
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low-capitalized stocks when short-selling is constrained, but almost no effect when shorting is
possible in either money, or money and stocks.
To shed further light on this issue, we run the regression from Eq. (4) with VOLm,st,p as the
dependent variable. The results for this regression also support Conjecture 4 (see Table 6): in setting 1,
without short-selling, bBMF_SSF,V is highly signiﬁcantly negative for both stocks, i.e. trading volume falls
with a higher intrinsic value. For the other two settings no such effect can be observed – the betas are
negative, but less pronounced and only one of the four betas is signiﬁcant.
As is often observed in experiments, trading activity decreases over time, i.e. bPER is negative for
both stocks and signiﬁcantly negative for stock B. As we observe more orders posted over time (see
Table 7) the lower trading volume hints at participants becoming more careful in accepting offers in
later periods. Signiﬁcant positive AR(1) terms can be attributed to session effects as well as persistence
of trading activity: a period with high trading volume is likely to be followed by another period of high
volume.
As a second measure for trading activity we take a look at the orders posted (ORD). Considering the
regression results presented in Table 7 we again ﬁnd that setting 3, with shorting in money and stocks
possible, is signiﬁcantlymore activewith 2,775 orders (average per session) vs. 2,175 orders in setting 1
and 2,236 in setting 2. According to those results, Conjecture 3 can be fully conﬁrmed for orders posted.
Our results also go in line with other studies (see Daouk and Charoenrook, 2005), who state that the
ability to short stocks will improve liquidity.
The signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcients for bBMF_SSF,V (setting 1) tells us that fewer orders are posted
for the stocks with higher intrinsic values, as the constraints on money and stocks bind traders. With
the restriction on borrowing money removed in setting 2 we see an (insigniﬁcant) positive coefﬁcientTable 7
Orders posted – results for the regression Eq. (4) with ORDm,st,p as the dependent variable, p-values for two-sided test.
Coeff. Stock A Stock B
Est. p val. Est. p val.
BMF_SSF 55.581 0.000 53.809 0.000
BMA_SSF 56.757 0.000 54.955 0.000
BMA_SSA 72.296 0.000 67.283 0.000
bBMF_SSF,V 9.485 0.000 7.591 0.000
bBMA_SSF,V 0.402 0.601 1.558 0.113
bBMA_SSA,V 3.490 0.005 1.634 0.089
bPER 0.023 0.954 0.446 0.014
AR(1) 0.647 0.000 0.446 0.000
R2 0.569 0.444
n 228 228
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ones. The corresponding coefﬁcients for setting 3 turn out to be negative again, but values are much
smaller compared to setting 1. All these results support Conjecture 4, which states that trading activity
should be higher for low-capitalized stocks when shorting constraints for money are present, but no
such effect should be visible when borrowing money is possible.
Autocorrelation is highly signiﬁcant in this regression, and is responsible for almost half of the ﬁt in
terms of R2. This indicates that the number of orders posted is prone to persistence effects, e.g. due to
a few very active traders that provide high liquidity in one session.5.4. Use of information
We nowexplore howmuch subjects traded on their private signals. Remember that subjects did not
get the true value of a stock, but a signal that could deviate by up to þ/3.9 from the true value.
Subjects receiving a very low signal (e.g. 6.1 when the true value is 10) are likely to sell, e.g. at a price of
10, while those receiving the highest signal (in this case 13.9) are likely to buy – assuming that subjects
do take their signals into account when trading. Fig. 4 shows that the observed frequency of a subject
being net-buyer of an asset at the end of a period (vertical axis) strongly depends on the deviation of
the private signal from the intrinsic value provided to this subject (horizontal axis). E.g. in settings 2
and 3 less than 10% of the subjects who received the lowest private signal (being) were net-buyers,
while more than 90% of those receiving the highest signal (vþ3.9) were net buyers. From the data
provided in Fig. 4 we conclude that subjects tended to follow the private signals they received. This
ﬁnding holds across all three settings.5.5. Short positions
Giving our subjects the opportunity to hold short positions in a session does not necessarily mean
that subjects made use of it. One might assume that business students are aware of the risk induced by
shorting stocks or cash and therefore avoid it. To get an impression of how extensive traders used the
opportunity to hold short positions we analyze in how many cases a trader ﬁnished a period withFig. 4. Relative number of observations where a trader was net-buyer of an asset at the end of a period for setting 1 (solid line),
setting 2 (long dashes) and setting 3 (short dashes).
Table 8
Percentage of cases where a subject had a short position at the end of a period and percentage of subjects that had short positions
at least once during their session.
Treatment Percentage of cases Percentage of subjects
Money Stocks Money Stocks
T2 10.6% 61.2%
T3 11.5% 5.1% 65.0% 58.7%
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least once during their session.
As shown in Table 8 we ﬁnd that around 11% of the cash holdings at the end of a period were
negative in T2 as well as T3. When shorting stocks was allowed we observe that only in 5% of all cases
traders had a negative position in stocks. But bear in mind that we have twice as many observations for
stocks and it is relatively unlikely that a subject goes short in stock A and B at the same time as she will
receive contrarily biased signals for the two stocks. Concerning the relative number of subjects that
held a short position at least one time during the experiment it becomes obvious that a majority of
subjects made use of the possibility to go short in stocks and cash as well.
Considering the cumulative distribution of stock holdings, as shown in Fig. 5, we can furthermore
see that extreme positions in stock holdings rarely occurred. In fewer than 1% of all cases a trader
ﬁnished a period with less than4 stocks in T3 or withmore than 15 stocks in any treatment. Note that
the distribution was cut off at 4; 12 to improve visibility.
5.6. Bid-ask-spreads
Next, we look at a proxy for liquidity, the bid-ask-spread. We calculate the bid-ask-spread at the end
of each period as
SPRm;st;p ¼ Askm;st;p;t¼120  Bidm;st;p;t¼120; (6)
and run regression Eq. (4).Fig. 5. Cumulative distribution of subjects’ stock holdings at the end of a period in setting 1 without shorting money or stocks (solid
line), in setting 2 where shorting money was allowed (long dashes), and setting 3 where going short was possible in money and
stocks (short dashes).
Table 9
Bid-ask-spread – results for the regression Eq. (4) with SPRm,st,p as the dependent variable, p-values for two-sided test.
Coeff. Stock A Stock B
Est. p val. Est. p val.
BMF_SSF 2.701 0.000 3.026 0.000
BMA_SSF 2.808 0.000 2.814 0.000
BMA_SSA 1.910 0.000 2.044 0.000
bBMF_SSF,V 0.288 0.106 0.532 0.001
bBMA_SSF,V 0.356 0.051 0.457 0.037
bBMA_SSA,V 0.310 0.000 0.163 0.242
bPER 0.120 0.000 0.129 0.000
AR (1) 0.180 0.034 0.058 0.567
R2 0.358 0.334
n 224 218
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was possible, than in the other two settings (see Table 9). This is signiﬁcant at the 1% level for both
stocks (Wald-test), supporting Conjecture 5. We have already seen that the number of orders posted is
signiﬁcantly higher when short-selling is possible and this obviously drives down bid-ask-spreads.
When short-selling is not possible only traders who own a stock can post asks for it and only those
who have money available can post bids. This limitation constrains especially those active traders who
sell all their stocks of A or B and are then no longer able to post asks for the respective stock. Again,
short-selling constraints seem more like a distorting factor than a useful regulation to ensure the
smooth functioning of markets.
All six slope coefﬁcients are positive, three of them signiﬁcant, showing that bid-ask-spreads are
higher for stocks with relatively high intrinsic values (and thus prices) than for stocks with relatively
low intrinsic values. This is not surprising, as spreads can be expected to be higher for stocks trading at
95 than for stocks trading at 5.
The signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcients of bPER are in line with our results on orders posted – this
number increases over time and thus lowers bid-ask-spreads.
5.7. Volatility
We measure volatility per period by calculating the standard deviation sm,st,p of absolute price
changes within each period. With the resulting 240 data points per stock we run the OLS regression
Eq. (4).
In Table 10 we see that volatility is lower in setting 3, where borrowing money and shorting stocks
was possible, than in the other two settings (a Wald-test shows that three out of four differences areTable 10
Volatility – results for the regression Eq. (4) with sm,s,t,p as the dependent variable, p-values for two-sided tests.
Coeff. Stock A Stock B
Est. p val. Est. p val.
BMF_SSF 2.062 0.000 2.184 0.000
BMA_SSF 2.199 0.000 2.032 0.000
BMA_SSA 1.681 0.000 1.775 0.000
bBMF_SSF,V 0.153 0.237 0.078 0.435
bBMA_SSF,V 0.296 0.008 0.204 0.035
bBMA_SSA,V 0.167 0.060 0.263 0.016
bPER 0.051 0.000 0.053 0.000
AR (1) 0.127 0.177 0.233 0.008
R2 0.229 0.241
n 228 228
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allowing short-selling improves market efﬁciency rather than harming it.
All slope coefﬁcients are positive, three of them signiﬁcant, showing – similar to bid-ask-spreads –
that volatility is higher for stocks with higher intrinsic values. We attribute this to the higher bid-ask-
spreads reported above.
As indicated by the signiﬁcantly negative factor for bPER, volatility decreases over the course of the
experiment. This pattern is commonly observed in laboratory markets and is usually explained by
learning of the participants (see Kirchler and Huber, 2007).
6. Conclusion
In this paper we used laboratory experiments to explore the effects of short-selling constraints on
information aggregation in markets. Our main ﬁnding is that allowing short positions in stocks and
money increases efﬁciency and reduces volatility and bid-ask-spreads. When shorting stocks is con-
strained we observe a systematic bias in prices. This bias works in different directions for stocks with
low and high capitalization – while the former are systematically overpriced, the latter usually trade
below their intrinsic value. When going short in stocks and borrowing money are possible, no
systematic pattern is observed and prices are close to intrinsic values. We examined portfolio data,
trading activity, and liquidity to explain the observed bias.
We found that the concentration of stock holdings depends strongly on the capitalization of a stock
when borrowing money is not possible, but not when it is allowed. With respect to trading activity we
see that the number of orders posted is signiﬁcantly higher for setting 3, where borrowing money and
shorting stocks is allowed, thereby also driving down the bid-ask-spread and volatility. Trading activity
is signiﬁcantly higher for low-capitalized stocks than for high-capitalized ones when borrowingmoney
is not possible, while this effect is not observable in settings 2 and 3 where borrowing money was
allowed. The issues discussed here are highly relevant from a regulatory point of view. Today, on
a global scale, constraints of shorting and borrowing vary, and relative capitalizations vary between
and within markets. Ignoring such differences may result in unwanted effects.
Caveats when trying to draw conclusions from our results for real capital markets include: in our
experiments borrowing money and shorting stocks –when allowed –was free of costs, while in reality
borrowing money as well as short selling of stocks is limited and costly. Furthermore we did not vary
divergence of opinions,whichwe leave to future research.13 However,with two risky assetswe consider
our market setting to be closer to real markets than earlier experiments where only one asset was
traded (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Fellner and Theissen, 2011; King et al., 1993). The clarity of our
resultsmay help to shed light on the divergent empirical results on short-selling constraints: apart from
the degree of divergence of opinions among investors and the degree of the short-selling constraints,
relative market capitalization was found to be a third crucial factor for the price level of a stock.
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Appendix. Instructions of the experiment
Background of the experiment
This experiment is concerned with replication of an asset market where traders can trade stocks of
two ﬁctitious companies for 20 independent periods.13 Empirical results from Chang et al. (2007) suggest that divergence of opinions ampliﬁes overvaluation caused by short-
selling constraints.
F. Hauser, J. Huber / Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (2012) 1279–1298 1295Characteristics of the market
Each period is independent from the others. Stock and money holdings are not carried over, but
liquidated at the end of each period. As a participant, you start each period with 200 units of exper-
imental currency, 4 stocks of company A, and 4 stocks of company B. The intrinsic value of the two
stocks always adds up to 100. The value of your stocks before trading is therefore 400 and your total
wealth is 600. At the start of each period each participant receives private information about the
intrinsic value of the two stocks. This private information differs for each participant and is distributed
normally around the intrinsic value with a standard deviation of 2. The quality of information you
receive (closeness to real intrinsic values) changes randomly from period to period. Sometimes youwill
know the exact intrinsic values, while at others your estimate will deviate more from the intrinsic
values. At the end of each period all stocks are bought back by the bank at their intrinsic value. Proﬁts
and losses are calculated by deducting the initial endowment of 600 (see screenshot “history screen”
for further details).
Trading
The trading mechanism is implemented as a double auction. This means that you can buy and
sell stocks, whereby each transaction is for one stock (see screenshot “trading screen” for further
details).
Only in Setting 1 (borrowing money and shorting stocks forbidden):
You can enter as many bids and asks within the price range of 0 and 100 (with a precision of one
decimal place) as you wish. However, you can only sell/enter as many asks for a stock as the number of
respective stocks you own. Bids can only be entered as long as you have enough money to honor those
bids.
Only in Setting 2 (borrowing money allowed, shorting stocks forbidden):
You can enter as many bids and asks within the price range of 0 and 100 (with a precision of one
decimal place) as you wish. However, you can only sell/enter as many asks for a stock as the number of
respective stocks you own. Negative holdings of money are possible without limitations or additional
costs.
Only in Setting 3 (borrowing money and shorting stocks allowed):
You can enter as many bids and asks within the price range of 0 and 100 (with a precision of
one decimal place) as you wish. Negative holdings of stock or money are possible without limi-
tations or additional costs. When you end a period with negative holdings of stocks the intrinsic
value of the stock multiplied with the (negative) number you hold will be deducted from your total
wealth.
Final payment
The average payment for all participants is $ 22. Gains/losses in experimental currency will raise/
lower your individual payment by 0.02 $ per unit of experimental currency.
Important details
 Payout-creating trading will be preceded by 4 trial periods.
 The experiment will run for 20 periods.
 The sum of the two intrinsic values is always 100.
 Each trading period lasts for 120 s.
Fig E1. Trading screen.
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Fig E2. History screen.
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